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Different approaches to corporate reporting
regulation: how jurisdictions differ and why
Christian Leuz*
Abstract— This paper discusses differences in countries’ approaches to reporting regulation and explores the reasons why
they exist in the first place as well as why they are likely to persist. I first delineate various regulatory choices and discuss the
trade-offs associated with these choices. I also provide a framework that can explain differences in corporate reporting
regulation. Next, I present descriptive and stylised evidence on regulatory and institutional differences across countries.
There are robust institutional clusters around the world. I discuss that these clusters are likely to persist given the
complementarities among countries’ institutions. An important implication of this finding is that reporting practices are
unlikely to converge globally, despite efforts to harmonise reporting standards. Convergence of reporting practices is also
unlikely due to persistent enforcement differences around the world. Given an ostensibly strong demand for convergence in
reporting practices for globally operating firms, I propose a different way forward that does not require convergence of
reporting regulation and enforcement across countries. The idea is to create a ‘global player segment’, in which member firms
play by the same reporting rules and face the same enforcement. Such a segment could be created and administered by a
supra-national body like IOSCO.
Keywords: accounting; regulation; IFRS; US GAAP; SEC; standard-setting, mandatory disclosure; political economy
1. Introduction and overview
Corporate reporting regulation has seen substantial
changes in recent years. Many of them were in
response to corporate reporting scandals and per-
ceived shortcomings during financial crises around
the world. Moreover, there has been a concerted
effort to converge countries’ reporting standards.
But despite this effort substantial differences in
countries’ reporting regulation and practices
remain. This paper explores these differences and
the reasons why they exist as well as why they are
likely to persist in the foreseeable future. My
analysis and comparison are conducted at a fairly
high level to emphasise that reporting regulation is a
part of a country’s broader institutional framework.
Throughout the paper, I give special emphasis to
enforcement issues because of two related reasons.
First, there are still considerable differences in the
enforcement systems across countries, which are
unlikely to converge in the near or medium-term
future. Second, many countries have chosen to
adopt International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). Given this convergence of reporting stand-
ards, enforcement differences are going to play a
(relatively) larger and more important role in
shaping firms’ reporting practices in the future.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I
delineate different approaches to reporting regula-
tion by discussing various regulatory choices and
the trade-offs associated with them. I also provide a
framework to explain why countries have different
reporting regulations. Section 3 highlights that there
are interdependencies between various regulatory
choices and more generally that there are comple-
mentarities between the elements of countries’
institutional infrastructures. That is, in well-func-
tioning economies, institutional elements are
chosen to fit each other. As a result of these
complementarities, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to attribute regulatory differences across countries
to any particular set of explanatory factors.
However, the broader structure of reporting regu-
lation can nevertheless be understood in the context
of countries’ institutional infrastructures. This
structure is heavily influenced by the role that
corporate reporting plays in the economy, which in
turn likely reflects the informational and contracting
needs of the key parties in that economy.
Section 4 explores differences in countries’
reporting, securities and investor protection regula-
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tions empirically using descriptive cluster analysis.
My analysis shows the existence of robust institu-
tional clusters, i.e. countries that share similar
institutional features. These clusters are consistent
with the existence of institutional complementa-
rities and similar to broad (and more ad hoc)
categorisations that have been widely used in the
literature to group countries, such as legal origin,
cultural and geographical region, and country
wealth. Moreover, the analysis shows that countries
with a stronger reliance on external finance and
arm’s length transactions tend to have stronger
reporting regulation (both in terms of rules and
enforcement) in securities, investor protection and
self-dealing laws than countries with a stronger
reliance on relationships and insider governance.
Consistent with prior work, I also demonstrate that
reporting practices in countries with stronger regu-
lation and enforcement tend to be more transparent
based on widely used transparency (or opacity)
scores.
In Section 5, I discuss the evolution of reporting
regimes and hence the question of how differences
in reporting regulation and practices will evolve
going forward. I explain the implications of insti-
tutional complementarities for institutional change
and point to the central role of enforcement
differences for the global convergence of reporting
practices. The main message is that convergence of
reporting practices is unlikely in the foreseeable
future, unless countries also converge along other
institutional dimensions, which is very unlikely for
many elements, like countries’ legal and enforce-
ment systems.1 At the same time, there appears to be
a strong demand for comparability and convergence
of reporting practices for globally operating firms.
This demand is one of the key drivers behind the
adoption of IFRS in many countries around the
world. Recognising this demand, I propose a
different way forward that does not require conver-
gence of countries’ reporting regulation and
enforcement systems. The idea is to create a ‘global
player segment’ (GPS), in which member firms play
by the same reporting rules and face the same
enforcement. For many firms, the rules and the
enforcement are likely to be stricter than what they
face in their home countries. Such a segment could
be administered by a supra-national institution, for
example, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) at the worldwide
level, or the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR) at the European level. This
approach promises greater convergence of reporting
practices for those firms for which there is a strong
market demand for comparability than the current
approach, which has mainly relied on countries
mandating the adoption of IFRS. There is ample
evidence suggesting that IFRS adoption alone is
unlikely to yield comparable reporting around the
world (e.g. Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003;
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Daske et al., 2008, 2009).
2. Different approaches to reporting
regulation: theory and basic choices
There are many different approaches to reporting
regulation and regulators face many choices in
designing the corporate reporting system. This
section discusses several of these regulatory choices
and the trade-offs associated with them.2 It provides
the conceptual underpinnings for this paper and
therefore largely abstracts from countries’ actual
choices. It also provides a brief literature overview
on these topics. Generally speaking, the reasons
why regulation can be beneficial are fairly well
understood in the literature. But we have far less
research on the advantages and disadvantages of
various forms of regulation and the process of
regulation itself. For this reason, my discussion
focuses on these aspects.
2.1. Why do we regulate?
The first choice that a regulator faces is the decision
whether or not to regulate. As many have pointed
out, the mere fact that disclosure of corporate
information can have benefits to firms, such as
lowering their cost of capital, is not sufficient to
justify a mandate because firms have incentives to
voluntarily provide information for which the
benefits exceed the costs (e.g. Ross, 1979).
Moreover, firms could enter into a private contract
with investors stipulating the desired disclosures.
Prior work has shown that we need some friction in
private contracting to justify regulation. For the
most part, the rationales are not specific to reporting
regulation and have been used in many other
regulatory contexts, although there are context-
specific versions.3
The literature commonly provides the following
four main reasons to justify the regulation of firms’
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 08 ABR Leuz.3d Page 230 of 256
1 Hail et al. (2009) reach a similar conclusion when analysing
the economic and policy factors of IFRS adoption in the US.
2 This section draws heavily on an earlier survey by Leuz and
Wysocki (2008) on the economic consequences of financial
reporting and disclosure regulation.
3 Hermalin and Katz (1993) show in a general bargaining
context that there are only three reasons for outside interference
with private contracting: (i) the parties are asymmetrically
informed ex ante; (ii) there is an externality on a third party; and
(iii) the state has access to more remedies than private parties.
See also Aghion and Hermalin (1990).
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financial reporting and disclosure activities: the
existence of externalities, market-wide cost savings
from regulation, insufficient private (or stricter
public) sanctions, and dead-weight costs from
fraud and agency conflicts that could be mitigated
by disclosure. These reasons are related and are
sometimes combined. I briefly review these argu-
ments below but refer the reader to Leuz and
Wysocki (2008) for a more extensive discussion.4
The first argument is that corporate reporting of
financial information creates externalities. To the
extent that these externalities are positive, they
provide a rationale for mandating the socially
optimal level of disclosure. However, financial
disclosure can also create negative externalities
(e.g. Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). Moreover, the
(socially) optimal level of disclosure likely is
context- and firm-specific, and also depends on
the goal of reporting regulation, making it difficult
for regulators to mandate the ‘right’ level of
disclosure.
The second argument put forth to justify report-
ing regulation is that a mandatory regime can
produce cost savings for the economy as a whole.
For instance, standardisation of corporate reporting
can make it easier for users to process the informa-
tion and to compare across firms. Similarly, a
mandatory regime can save costs to firms if it
requires those disclosures that almost all firms are
willing to provide voluntarily (Ross, 1979). The
requirement saves firms the cost of negotiating
disclosures with various parties (e.g. shareholders,
creditors, etc.) when the result does not vary much
across firms and hence the costs of complying with
a one-size-fits-all regime are relatively low. In this
instance, regulation provides a low-cost standard-
ised solution (e.g. Mahoney, 1995; Rock, 2002).
A third and closely related argument recognises
that firms often voluntarily seek commitments to a
particular level of transparency, for instance, when
raising outside finance. But privately producing a
credible commitment to transparency can be very
expensive and in some cases even impossible. One
reason is that the penalties private contracts can
impose are generally limited to monetary sanctions
and that the parties face wealth constraints. In this
case, the so-called judgment-proof problem arises:
the penalty necessary to induce the desired behav-
iour may exceed the wealth of the contracting
parties (Shavell, 1986). Thus, regulation, which
generally comes with a public enforcer and criminal
penalties, could be beneficial if it allows firms to
commit more credibly.
The fourth argument to justify reporting regula-
tion is perhaps more subtle and less commonly used
to justify disclosure regulation (see also Leuz and
Wysocki, 2008). It recognises that agency conflicts
and the consumption of private benefits by control-
ling insiders can have social (or dead-weight) costs.
It seems plausible that diversion activities to obtain
private benefits are costly, in which case there are
social losses (e.g. Burkhart et al., 1998; Shleifer and
Wolfenzon, 2002). Perhaps more importantly, con-
trolling insiders are likely to forgo profitable
investment opportunities for the sake of private
benefits (e.g. Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). This
behaviour is not costly to society as long as other
firms can exploit the opportunities that are left on
the table. But there can be substantial social costs if
other firms cannot exploit them and hence these
opportunities are lost to the economy as whole.
Therefore, competition and the ability of new
entrants to raise capital play an important role for
the extent to which the consumption of private
benefits has social costs (Rajan and Zingales,
2003).5 Here, a mandatory disclosure regime can
help in two ways. First, it makes it easier for new
entrants to commit to transparency so that they can
raise the necessary capital to exploit opportunities
forgone by the incumbents. Second, it may also
make it harder for controlling insiders to consume
private benefits and thus mitigate the root cause of
the problem.
Clearly, reporting regulation has not only benefits
but also costs. Operating a mandatory reporting
regime and providing the necessary enforcement
can be quite costly. Moreover, regulatory solutions
are far from perfect and face many problems
(e.g. Stigler, 1971; Peltzman et al., 1989). One
problem is that regulators are often not as well
informed about the relevant cost-benefit trade-offs
as firms. Another problem is that regulation is
generally created by political processes, which have
many shortcomings and limitations. Thus, a market
failure alone is not sufficient to justify regulation.
As Coase (1960) points out, competition and private
contracting can address market failures as well. A
solid case for regulation needs to include arguments
as to why a proposed regulatory solution would in
practice achieve better outcomes or be cheaper than
a market solution. Otherwise, we fall quickly victim
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4 Further discussions can be found in Ross (1979), Seligman
(1983), Coffee (1984), Easterbrook and Fischel (1984),
Mahoney (1995), Ferrell (2004), and Hermalin and Weisbach
(2007). Hart (2009) discusses a few additional reasons such as
bounded rationality or a desire to influence tastes.
5 Competition is also likely to limit the extent to which
controlling insiders can appropriate resources without threaten-
ing the survival of the firm.
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to the Nirvana fallacy (Demsetz, 1969). An import-
ant and often overlooked issue in this regard is the
implementation and enforcement of regulation (see
also Shleifer, 2005). The aforementioned benefits of
regulation can only materialise if the rules are
properly implemented and enforced. As a conse-
quence, enforcement systems play a major role for
reporting regulation. I discuss this in more detail
below.
Overall, there seems to be a reasonable case for a
mandatory reporting regime. Consistent with this
view, mandatory reporting regimes are widespread
around the world. However, existing reporting
regimes are not necessarily optimal. In fact, it is
possible that existing regimes ‘overshot’ in their
disclosure requirements. In the end, much depends
on the design of the reporting regime, including the
enforcement mechanisms. I therefore focus on
various design choices in the remainder of this
section.
2.2. Who do we regulate and what is the goal of
reporting regulation?
Another important choice that regulators have to
make with respect to reporting regulation is who
they should regulate. Much of the reporting
regulation in developed countries around the
world is geared towards firms, in particular,
publicly traded firms. The latter group is typically
required to disclose a set of audited financial
statements to investors and the general public on a
regular basis. In many countries (e.g. all EU
member states), this requirement extends to private
limited companies.
As much of the relevant information resides
within firms, it makes sense for firms to provide
certain disclosures. It pre-empts costly private
information acquisition and avoids a duplication
of efforts by investors, financial analysts and other
information intermediaries (e.g. Diamond, 1985).
Thus, it is not surprising that reporting regulation in
most countries is based on the model that (publicly
traded) firms provide disclosures to individual
investors. Today, however, investment in publicly
traded firms is largely intermediated, meaning that a
large fraction of households’ stock ownership has
migrated to financial intermediaries such as pension
funds, mutual funds, and life insurance companies.
In the US, institutional ownership rose from less
than 10% in the 1930s to more than 70% today.
Similar trends, albeit at different rates and levels,
can be observed in other countries (e.g. Rydqvist et
al., 2009). This trend naturally raises the question of
whether individual investors should still be viewed
as the primary user of firms’ financial reports or at
the centre of the mandatory reporting model
(Zingales, 2009). This question in turn leads us to
the issue of what the goals of corporate reporting
regulation are.
One goal of reporting regulation can be the
protection of small and unsophisticated individual
investors against better informed insiders and
promoters. US securities regulation was introduced
in the 1930s with this goal in mind. The basic idea
was that extensive disclosure requirements rein in
fraudulent activities and level the playing field
among investors (e.g. Brandeis, 1914; Loss and
Seligman, 2001; Mahoney, 2009). However, with
the trend towards financial intermediation, institu-
tional investors dominate financial markets today.
There is also an abundance of information sources.
Thus, it is not obvious that corporate disclosure
regulation should still focus on protecting small and
unsophisticated investors (Zingales, 2009). Instead,
it might make more sense to design corporate
reporting regulation with the needs of sophisticated
users such as financial analysts and institutional
investors in mind. However, the transformation
from individual to institutional ownership has not
made the protection of unsophisticated investors
redundant or outdated. The problem has merely
been shifted to the relationship between small
investors and financial intermediaries. Today, this
interface deserves more attention and it is possible
that we need more extensive disclosures by finan-
cial intermediaries about their practices, rather than
firms (Zingales, 2009).
Protecting small investors in the securities mar-
kets is not the only conceivable goal for reporting
regulation. An important goal of reporting regula-
tion in many Continental European countries is to
protect creditors (including suppliers) by restricting
dividends and other payments from a corporation to
residual claimants (e.g. owners, tax authorities).6 In
these economies, current and retained earnings play
a major role in determining howmuch a corporation
can pay out in dividends or has to pay in taxes. In
this case, the role of earnings is not to inform
investors about a firm’s economic performance but
to determine a distributable profit and, more
generally, to facilitate debt contracting. In fact,
even in the UK and the US, the development of
accounting practices is very closely linked to the
role of accounting in debt contracting and, in
particular, in dividend restrictions (e.g. Watts, 1977;
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Leuz et al., 1998;
Kothari et al., 2009).
In many countries, an important goal of financial
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 08 ABR Leuz.3d Page 232 of 256
6 See, e.g. Leuz and Wüstemann (2004) for Germany.
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regulation more broadly is to preserve the stability
of the financial system and investors’ confidence in
financial markets.7 Disclosure requirements obvi-
ously play a role in achieving this broader goal as
well. As a result, reporting regulation generally
serves multiple (overlapping) goals. Generally, the
goals can and do differ across countries. Their
choice is likely driven by the role of corporate
reporting in the economy, which in turn depends on
many other institutional and market factors, such as
the structure of the capital markets and the legal
system. However, a reasonable conjecture is that, in
well-functioning economies, the reporting system is
geared towards satisfying the informational and
contracting needs of the key parties in the economy,
as this focus generates transaction cost savings (and
is also plausible from a political economy point of
view). The identity of these key parties can
obviously differ across countries, as can the chan-
nels through which these needs are satisfied – public
disclosure is only one of them.
2.3. Who should regulate and at what level?
In designing reporting regulation, we also need to
decide who should regulate (or set the standards).
Reporting regimes can be created privately, e.g. by a
professional standard-setter or an exchange via a
listing agreement, or by a public regulator via a
mandate, or by the judiciary and a law. Private
standard-setters could be viewed as closer to a
market solution, offering expertise in complicated
technical matters, and generally set up to be
independent in an attempt to reduce political
influence. But they lack investigative and enforce-
ment powers that public regulators are generally
endowed with.
A closely related decision is at what level
reporting regulation takes place. It is conceivable
to create reporting regimes at the exchange, state,
country or at a supranational level. Obviously, these
choices can be combined. For instance, a country
could mandate corporate reporting by law, create a
public regulator for oversight and enforcement, but
leave the creation of specific reporting rules to a
private standard-setter. This is essentially the US
model for reporting regulation. But other models are
conceivable, and exist around the world.
In general, regulating at a higher level
(e.g. country) generates larger benefits from stand-
ardisation and exploits network externalities. This is
one of the reasons behind the push towards IFRS
around the world (e.g. Währisch, 2001). Regulating
at a lower level (e.g. exchange) allows more fine-
tuning to needs of firms and investors, and hence
avoids the problems of a one-size-fits-all approach
(e.g. Bushee and Leuz, 2005). Regulation at a lower
level (e.g. state or exchange) can also facilitate
competition among regulatory regimes
(e.g. Mahoney, 1997; Choi and Guzman, 1998;
Romano, 1998 and 2001; Huddart et al., 1999;
Sunder, 2002). Regulatory competition requires that
firms are free to choose among regimes, as other-
wise competition is severely limited. But even then
competition among regulatory regimes faces ser-
ious limitations (Fox, 1999; Coates, 2001; Rock,
2002). One issue is that a firm’s regime is typically
chosen by managers, and not by shareholders,
which implies competition may be hampered by
agency problems. Another issue is that competition
among regimes can provide incentives to be lenient
when it comes to enforcing rules. This concern
arises in particular when exchanges compete for
listings (e.g. Kahan, 1997; Gadinis and Jackson,
2007; but see also Huddart et al., 1999). Moreover,
exchanges and private standard-setters typically
have limited investigative powers and do not have
the power to impose criminal penalties if their rules
are violated. Exchanges can expel or delist firms,
which can be a significant threat or sanction, but as
discussed in Section 2.1 access to criminal penalties
could be one reason to have regulation in the first
place.
A way to maintain access to criminal penalties
and centralised enforcement but to fine-tune the
rules to particular firms is to introduce a system of
scaled regulation with multiple tiers. Such a
system could, for instance, include three tiers: a
premier segment, a standard segment, and a
segment for smaller growth firms (see also Leuz
and Wysocki, 2006). The premier segment would
have the most onerous reporting requirements,
while the other two segments would offer exemp-
tions and less stringent requirements. The regulator
could let firms opt into these segments or could
assign firms to these segments based on certain
criteria, e.g. the perceived benefits from stricter
reporting regulation.8 Germany’s Deutsche Börse
offers a two-tier structure for the same exchange
and within the German enforcement system. The
various ‘new markets’ or ‘alternative markets’
around the world (such as London’s Alternative
Investment Market) are examples of market seg-
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 08 ABR Leuz.3d Page 233 of 256
7 For instance, the UK’s Financial Services and Markets Act
sets out four statutory objectives: market confidence, public
awareness, consumer protection, and reduction of financial
crime. See also Jackson (2006).
8 In Section 4, I discuss how this concept could be
implemented at the international level and with respect to
IFRS reporting.
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ments offering reporting regulation geared towards
smaller growth firms.
It is important to recognise that even if firms are
not given an explicit choice among regulatory
regimes, they still have many (implicit) choices and
can respond to the imposition of regulation. For
instance, firms can go private, raise money from an
unregulated market, or choose not to go public.
Such avoidance strategies can impair the effective-
ness of regulation or can lead to unintended
consequences.9 Thus, understanding firms’ poten-
tial responses and their avoidance strategies is
crucial when designing and evaluating reporting
regulation.
These issues become even more complicated in
international securities markets. Here, the regula-
tions of various countries interact with each other
(e.g. Stulz, 2009). The liberalisation and globalisa-
tion of financial markets has given firms more ways
to respond to home-country regulation, to attract
capital from foreign investors and to ‘opt into’
stricter foreign regulatory regimes. For instance,
firms can cross-list in another country to subject
themselves to (stricter) foreign regulation in order to
overcome regulatory, institutional, or other con-
straints in the home country and to reassure outside
investors. This is the basic idea behind the so-called
bonding hypothesis advanced by Coffee (1999) and
Stulz (1999) to explain why many firms, particu-
larly from emergingmarket economies, have sought
cross-listings on US exchanges. US securities laws
give stronger rights to outside investors and require
more extensive disclosures than many other coun-
tries. Perhaps more importantly, the SEC and US-
style private securities litigation enforce these rules
more strictly than other countries (Coffee, 2007).
The cross-listing literature shows that there are
firms that voluntarily seek stricter regulation and
that investors reward such behaviour.10 But it also
demonstrates that not all firms (or controlling
insiders) find stricter commitments beneficial
(e.g. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Doidge et
al., 2009b). The cross-listing literature also illus-
trates my point that firms have regulatory choices
even if the (home-country) regime does not expli-
citly provide them.
2.4. What information should be reported and how
much discretion do firms have?
A key design choice, and typically the most debated
issue, concerns what information firms (or financial
intermediaries) should actually report and how the
information should be reported. This issue has
explicitly or implicitly been the motivation for
decades of accounting research, and it is obviously
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss specific
reporting or disclosure rules. However, it is worth
pointing out that the question of what firms should
report ties closely into the question of why regula-
tion is beneficial in the first place. If the underlying
rationale for regulation is to create cost savings by
mandating a standardised solution that is close to
what firms would be willing to provide in private
contracts, then the rules should focus on general-
purpose information that is likely to be useful for
many different contracts. If the underlying rationale
is based on dead-weight costs from fraud and
agency conflicts, the rules should focus on infor-
mation that aids in the detection of fraud or is useful
in assessing agency conflicts or in monitoring
insiders.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that
mandating disclosures has costs. There are the
direct costs of producing, disseminating and veri-
fying the information. In addition, there can be
indirect costs because disclosures to capital market
participants can also be used by other parties
(e.g. competitors, labour unions, regulators, tax
authorities, etc.). For example, detailed information
about line-of-business profitability can reveal pro-
prietary information to competitors (e.g. Verrecchia,
1983; Wagenhofer, 1990; Feltham et al., 1992).
Mandating all firms to provide the same information
is likely to dampen proprietary costs because then
firms not only give information to their competitors
but also obtain information from them. But it is
clear that there are limits to what regulation should
compel firms to provide. Full disclosure would
ultimately destroy firms’ incentives to innovate and
threaten their very existence.
An important choice in designing reporting
regulation is the degree to which the rules provide
discretion to firms. The accounting literature has
pointed out that discretion is a double-edged sword.
On one hand, discretion makes the application of
reporting regulation less costly for firms. Moreover,
it allows corporate insiders to convey private
information that resides within the firm and to
adapt reports so that they better reflect the under-
lying economic reality. On the other hand, discre-
tion can be used opportunistically. For instance,
corporate insiders could use reporting discretion to
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9 The studies by Jarrell (1981), Bushee and Leuz (2005), Leuz
et al. (2008) provide examples.
10 Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, empirical studies
show that foreign firms with cross listings in the US raise more
external finance, have higher valuations, a lower cost of capital,
more analyst following and report higher-quality accounting
numbers than their foreign counterparts (e.g. Reese and
Weisbach, 2002; Lang et al. 2003a and 2003b; Doidge et al.,
2004 and 2009a; Bailey et al., 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2009).
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hide poor economic performance, achieve certain
earnings targets, or avoid covenant violations.
Given insiders’ information advantage, it is difficult
to constrain such behaviour. As a result, how firms
use discretion built into the reporting rules largely
depends on insiders’ reporting incentives. These
incentives are shaped by many factors, including
capital market forces, corporate governance and
countries’ institutional factors (e.g. Ball et al., 2003;
Burgstahler et al., 2006). Thus, the optimal level of
discretion built into reporting regulation is more
likely to be a function of a country’s institutional
infrastructure, i.e. not independent of other elem-
ents in the infrastructure.
2.5. How are the rules enforced?
An important regulatory choice that is often given
less attention than the design of the rules is the
question of how the rules are enforced. This
question comprises deciding who enforces the
rules (e.g. contracting parties, independent third
party, public enforcer), how compliance is moni-
tored (e.g. a regulator, such as the SEC, reviews
firms’ filings) and what penalties and sanctions are
available in case of a violation (e.g. monetary, non-
monetary, criminal penalties).
As always, there are various trade-offs among
these choices. For instance, when enforcement is
left to the contracting parties, well-functioning
courts are of central importance. When enforcement
is delegated to a third party such as an auditor or to a
public enforcement agency, the incentives of the
enforcer and the question of who monitors the
monitor become central issues. Emphasising the
role of enforcement, Djankov et al. (2003) and
Shleifer (2005) have put forward an enforcement
theory of regulation. The premise of this theory is
that all strategies to implement a socially desirable
policy are imperfect and that optimal institutional
design involves a trade-off between imperfect
alternatives. As a result, implementation and
enforcement play a central role for the success of
regulation.
Surprisingly, the accounting literature has given
less attention to the issue of enforcement, despite
the fact that enforcement is critical to the proper
application of the accounting rules.11 However,
there is a growing literature on the role of
enforcement differences across countries for finan-
cial market outcomes and also accounting quality
(e.g. La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2006; Leuz et al.,
2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006). In fact, Coffee
(2007) argues that such enforcement differences do
a better job explaining differences in financial
development, market valuations and the cost of
capital across countries than formal legal rules or
disclosure standards. In addition, there is a nascent
literature on the relative role of public versus
private enforcement for financial development (La
Porta et al., 2006; Jackson, 2007; Jackson and Roe,
2009).
3. Interdependencies among regulatory
choices
In designing reporting regulation, it is important to
recognise that there are interdependencies between
the various regulatory choices outlined in the
previous sections. I have already alluded to several
of these interdependencies. Below I provide a few
more examples and then introduce the concept of
institutional complementarities. This concept is
central to understanding why countries differ in
their differences in (reporting) regulation across
countries.
An important (and obvious) example is inter-
dependencies between reporting rules and enforce-
ment. As a result, reporting rules cannot be designed
without considering enforcement, and vice versa.
For instance, it is possible that a particular rule gives
too much discretion to management and, as a result,
makes the enforcement of the rule impossible or
very costly. Private enforcement mechanisms, such
as shareholder litigation, rely heavily on the avail-
ability of information to outside investors, and
hence benefit from disclosure requirements. The
interdependencies between rules and enforcement
are also at the heart of the debate about ‘rules versus
principles’ in the accounting literature. Rules-based
standards tend to be more bright-line and are
generally easier to apply, but they are likely to
invite more gaming behaviour (e.g. contracting
around the rules) compared to principles-based
standards. Principles-based standards in turn give
more discretion to firms, which can enable man-
agers to convey private information to the markets
in a less costly fashion, but the discretion also
allows managers to pursue ulterior reporting
motives.
Another example is interdependencies between
ex ante rules and ex post remedies. Recent work by
Glaeser et al. (2001), Djankov et al. (2003) and
Shleifer (2005) points to these interdependencies
and argues that, generally speaking, there needs to
be a balance between ex ante regulation to induce
desirable outcomes (or discourage malfeasance)
versus ex post remedies to penalise undesirable
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(see, e.g., the surveys by Francis, 2004; DeFond and Francis,
2005).
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outcomes (or malfeasance).12 For example, if ex
ante regulation fails to specify all contingencies or
to foresee innovations in malfeasance, then parties
often rely on courts to settle the matter ex post. But
if the judicial ‘weapons’ are unequal across litigants
or there are agency problems with respect to the
courts and judges, ex post remedies can deliver
inefficient outcomes. For instance, it seems plaus-
ible that richer, better connected, and better repre-
sented controlling insiders have a stronger influence
on the course of justice than defrauded, small
investors (Shleifer, 2005). Ex ante rules can miti-
gate this shortcoming of private enforcement
because they limit court discretion (Shleifer,
2005). For example, it is easier for a firm to
convince a judge or jury that certain reporting
behaviour was appropriate when there are no
specific rules of what needs to be disclosed.
3.1. Notion of institutional complementarities
Reporting regulation is one of many elements of a
country’s institutional infrastructure.13 The elem-
ents of the institutional infrastructure are interde-
pendent. To see this, consider the role of corporate
reporting in financial contracting. Financial claims
and control rights are often defined in accounting
terms: e.g. financial ratios specify when a corporate
borrower is in (technical) default or how much the
borrower can pay in dividends. Investors in public
equity markets use corporate reports to monitor
their claims, make investment decisions or exercise
their rights at shareholder meetings. Firms will
probably respond to these needs by various parties
and, as a result, firms’ reporting practices are likely
to reflect ownership and financing patterns in a
country (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003).
Conversely, reporting standards can influence
financial contracting, for example, with respect to
leases, off-balance sheet financing, and equity-
based compensation. Due to these interdependen-
cies, it is reasonable to expect that corporate
reporting evolves in concert with other elements
of the institutional framework to facilitate, among
other things, financial transactions and contracting.
Put differently, in well-functioning economies,
corporate reporting regulation and other elements
of the institutional infrastructure are probably
designed to fit and reinforce each other.
In addition, there are transaction cost consider-
ations. It is generally cheaper to provide a common
set of reporting rules for many contracts than to
negotiate a particular set of rules on a contract-by-
contract basis (e.g. Ross, 1979; Mahoney, 1995;
Ball, 2001). To capitalise on these transaction cost
savings, countries are expected to design reporting
requirements for the informational and contracting
needs of the key parties (e.g. main suppliers of
finance) in an economy. Such a focus on the key
parties in the economy is also plausible because
they are active and powerful participants in the
political process (e.g. lobbying).
Thus, to the extent that the identity of the key
parties differs across countries, reporting regulation
is expected to differ across countries. Put differ-
ently, the notion of complementarities provides a
powerful explanation as to why reporting regulation
differs across countries and markets. It also has two
further implications. First, it is unlikely that there is
a reporting regime that is optimal for all countries
around the world. The net benefits of high-quality
corporate reporting are likely to vary significantly
across countries, and forcing certain disclosures can
impose substantial costs on firms. Thus, regulators
and standard-setters need to carefully weigh the
confluence of costs and benefits of reporting
regulation to firms, investors, and other parties in
the economy.
Second, the notion of complementarities implies
that we have to be careful in evaluating particular
reporting requirements in isolation from other
elements of the institutional framework.
Seemingly successful reporting regulation in one
country may not translate well to other countries.
For the same reason, unilateral changes in account-
ing standards (such as IFRS adoption) may not yield
the desired outcomes (e.g. Ball, 2006; Hail et al.,
2009).
3.2. Comparison of two stylised approaches to
reporting regulation14
To illustrate the role of institutional complement-
arities and their implications for corporate reporting,
I consider two stylised financial systems. Following
prior research, I distinguish between an ‘outsider’
system and a ‘relationship-based’ or ‘insider’ system
(e.g. Franks and Mayer, 1994; Berglöf, 1997;
Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997; Rajan and Zingales,
1998; Allen andGale, 2000). The two systems differ
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12 In a related fashion, Easterbrock and Fischel (1984) and
Mahoney (1995) argue that mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud
provisions are complementary.
13 A country’s institutional infrastructure (or framework)
comprises public and private rules, conventions and organisa-
tions that shape economic behaviour. This includes the legal
system, banking system, taxation system, capital markets,
regulatory and enforcement agencies, industry associations,
standard-setting bodies, etc.
14 This section borrows heavily from a similar comparison in
Leuz and Wüstemann (2004).
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fundamentally in the way they channel capital to
investment opportunities, how they ensure a return
to investors and, most importantly for my purposes,
in the way they reduce information asymmetries
between contracting and financing parties.
In an outsider system, firms rely heavily on
public debt or equity markets in raising capital.
Corporate ownership is dispersed and largely in the
hands of consumers that invest their savings directly
or indirectly via mutual funds in public debt or
equity markets. Thus, investors are at arm’s length
from firms and do not have privileged access to
information. They are protected by explicit con-
tracts and extensive rights, which in turn requires a
well-functioning legal system (La Porta et al.,
1998). In such a system, corporate reporting and
disclosure is crucial to resolve information asym-
metries among firms and investors. It enables
investors to monitor their financial claims and to
exercise their rights. Thus, the reporting system is
expected to focus on outside investors. Its goal is to
ensure that outside investors are reasonably well
informed and, hence, willing to invest in the public
debt and equity markets. Put differently, in an
outsider system, there is a strong demand for
transparent reporting (e.g. Ball et al., 2000;
Bushman et al., 2004; Burgstahler et al., 2006).
In contrast, in a relationship-based system, firms
establish close relationships with banks and other
financial intermediaries and rely heavily on internal
financing instead of raising capital in public equity
or debt markets. As a result, corporate ownership is
concentrated and corporate governance is mainly in
the hands of insiders (e.g. board members). In this
system, the key parties have privileged access to
information through their relationships, and infor-
mation asymmetries are resolved primarily via
private channels rather than public disclosure.
Here, the role of corporate reporting is not so
much to publicly disseminate information, but to
facilitate relationship-based financing, for instance,
by limiting the claims of outside shareholders to
dividends, which protects creditors and promotes
internal financing (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Leuz and
Wüstemann, 2004). Put differently, corporate
reporting and accounting takes on other roles,
such as the determination or restriction of payouts,
because insiders have privileged access to informa-
tion through their relationships and hence do not
rely on public disclosure. Thus, the key contracting
and financing parties are already reasonably well
informed. Outsiders may face a lack of transparency
but opacity is an important feature of the system
because it protects relationships from the threat of
competition (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
This comparison is clearly stylised and not meant
to describe the reporting system of a particular
country. In fact, most countries fall somewhere
between these two extremes. The point of this
comparison is to illustrate the notion of comple-
mentarities and their role in explaining why report-
ing regimes differ across countries. This simple
comparison also illustrates that it is important to
adopt a broader perspective when evaluating the
overall performance of reporting systems. In rela-
tionship-based economies, the goal of corporate
reporting is not likely to publicly disseminate
information and hence institutional comparisons
along this dimension can be misleading. A more
complete assessment should include private infor-
mation channels and contracting roles of corporate
reporting. In this regard, it is important to note that
commonly used datasets describing features of
countries’ reporting systems focus primarily on
disclosure and public information channels.
4. Different approaches to reporting
regulation: descriptive evidence
As Section 3 explains, countries are expected to
differ in their regulatory approaches to corporate
reporting given the many institutional differences
across countries. In this section, I provide basic
descriptive evidence and simple empirical analyses
illustrating these differences. I draw on prior
empirical studies creating and using various proxies
for countries’ institutional features, in particular, the
work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 2006) and
Djankov et al. (2008). Given the topic of my paper, I
focus on variables that broadly describe countries’
approaches to securities regulation and investor
protection and, in particular, the reporting require-
ments and enforcement mechanisms embedded in
these regulations.
4.1. Descriptive statistics on countries’ regulatory
regimes
Table 1 summarises institutional data for 49 coun-
tries around the world. These data were created or
updated in the 2000s. The first four columns
describe the origin of a country’s legal system, its
assignment to a cultural group based on cultural
variables and geographic considerations (Licht et
al., 2007), a binary classification into developed and
emerging capital markets, and the per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) in the year 2000.
The next three variables describe a country’s
securities regulation. Based on answers to an
extensive questionnaire distributed to security-law
attorneys in 49 countries, La Porta et al. (2006)
construct three scores capturing the nature and
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enforcement of rules governing security issuance.
Each score ranges from zero to one with higher
values indicating more extensive requirements or
stricter enforcement: (1) the first score captures
disclosure requirements at the country’s largest
stock exchange in securities offerings covering the
prospectus, directors’ compensation, ownership
structure and inside ownership, related-party trans-
actions and contracts; (2) the liability standard
index captures procedural difficulties in recovering
losses from the issuer, the directors and the
accountants in a civil liability case; (3) the public
enforcement index captures market supervision by a
country’s regulator, its investigative powers and the
sanctions available.
As prior work shows that investor protection and
corporate reporting are closely related (Leuz et al.,
2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006), the next four
columns contain indices describing the level of
outside investor protection: (1) the revised anti-
director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008)
captures aggregate shareholder rights, primarily
with respect to voting; (2) the second index
measures the strength of private enforcement of
provisions against self-dealing by insiders focusing
on ex ante control (e.g. requiring approval by
disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosures);
(3) the third index measures the strength of private
enforcement of provisions against self-dealing by
insiders focusing on ex post control (e.g. periodic
filings requirements and ease of proving wrong-
doing); (4) the fourth index captures the strength of
public enforcement of self-dealing provisions
related to approval and disclosure requirements.
For all four indices, higher values indicate more
extensive outside investor protection.
The last two columns in Table 1 contain variables
describing a country’s legal system: (1) the rule of
law index from Kaufmann et al. (2003) measures
the overall quality of the legal system including the
courts;15 (2) a binary variable indicating whether
class-action lawsuits are available to investors.
As Table 1 illustrates, regulatory regimes differ
considerably across countries. However, there are
also remarkable similarities among (certain) coun-
tries and robust patterns in countries’ institutional
characteristics. Table 2 highlights several of these
patterns. As documented by La Porta et al. (1997,
1998 and 2006) and Djankov et al. (2008), countries
with an English legal origin tend to have more
extensive disclosure requirements, stronger private
and public enforcement of securities regulation,
stronger shareholder and creditor rights, stricter
private and public protection against self-dealing,
and more frequently allow class-action lawsuits.
The only exceptions are the public enforcement of
self-dealing provisions and the rule of law index, for
which countries with German and Scandinavian
legal origins tend to score higher. Countries with a
French legal origin tend to have the lowest scores
for most of these variables. Exceptions are the
public enforcement of securities regulations and the
availability of class-action lawsuits.16
Grouping countries by cultural and geographical
region produces similar insights. English-speaking
countries tend to exhibit the highest scores on all
variables, except public enforcement of self-dealing
provisions and the overall quality of the legal
system. Countries in the Far East group have
relatively high scores with respect to the disclosure
requirements in securities laws, anti-director rights
and anti-self-dealing provisions, but score much
lower for public enforcement of self-dealing provi-
sions and the rule of law in general. Western
European countries generally have weaker secur-
ities laws and rely less on disclosure to address self-
dealing, consistent with the perception that they are
focused on relationships rather than arm’s length
contracting. Latin American countries tend to
exhibit the lowest scores for most institutional
variables.
Interestingly, using either the legal origin or the
cultural grouping, there is no clear pattern with
respect to the reliance on public versus private
enforcement mechanisms across different regula-
tions. For instance, Western European countries
have relatively low scores for public enforcement of
securities regulation but relatively high scores for
public enforcement of anti-self-dealing provisions.
This pattern is primarily driven by countries with
German or Scandinavian legal origins. Countries
with French legal origin exhibit the reverse pattern,
i.e. relatively high scores for public enforcement of
securities regulation. Thus, it is not necessarily the
case that countries with relatively stronger public
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 08 ABR Leuz.3d Page 240 of 256
15 La Porta et al. (1998) provide several other variables
capturing the effectiveness of the legal system. They are all
highly correlated with the rule of law variable. Moreover,
aggregating these proxies into a single legal quality variable
generally yields similar results. See also Berkowitz et al. (2003)
and Leuz et al. (2003).
16 In interpreting these findings, it is important to keep in
mind that available institutional data tends to rank countries
with respect to features that are desirable for outside investors
and arm’s length transactions. This explains why some countries
(e.g. those with English legal origin) score highly on almost all
characteristics. They tend to be organised as outsider economies
along the lines of my discussion in Section 3. Private channels
of communication among stakeholders are typically not evalu-
ated in these institutional datasets but these channels may play a
major role in insider economies.
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enforcement of securities laws also rely on strong
public enforcement when it comes to anti-self-
dealing provisions.
Splitting by market development, I find that
countries with developed markets exhibit higher
scores on almost all institutional variables than
emerging markets. The differences are particularly
pronounced for the rule of law. This result is not
surprising and confirms the central message of La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998 and 2006). Clearly, country
wealth plays an important role in this result. To
illustrate, if I partition the sample into three groups
based on a country’s per capita GDP, I find that
wealthier countries exhibit higher scores on all
variables, except public enforcement of securities
laws, for which the ranking is not monotonic in
country wealth.
In concluding this section, I should note that
Table 1 does not contain variables that directly
capture differences in reporting practices across
countries. Given the topic of this paper, the table
deliberately focuses on variables that describe the
regulatory regime, including the associated enforce-
ment system. However, firms’ actual reporting
practices depend crucially on the extent to which
the rules ‘on the books’ are actually enforced and
hence the extent to which the enforcement system
actually uses available powers and penalties. In this
regard, it is important to recall what the enforcement
variables in Table 1 actually measure. They score
countries, for instance, on the liability standards for
various parties, the ease of proving wrongdoing, the
investigative powers of the public supervisor, and
the severity of available criminal penalties. As such,
they describe the strength of countries’ enforcement
system but they do not necessarily capture actual
enforcement activities or the severity of the pen-
alties imposed (see also Jackson and Roe, 2009). I
discuss this issue in more detail in Section 4.3.
4.2. Evidence on institutional clusters
Next, I turn to the question of what explains
countries’ regulatory choices and hence institutional
patterns such as those in Table 1. The notion of
institutional complementarities implies that there
are combinations of institutional characteristics that
are likely to be jointly observed. But what explains
whether a country chooses a particular combination
of institutional characteristics? This question has
been heavily debated in the law and finance
literature (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al.,
2003; Berkowitz et al., 2003; Rajan and Zingales,
2003; Coffee, 2007). But it cannot be answered by a
simple regression analysis. As institutional arrange-
ments are likely to have been jointly chosen or have
jointly evolved over time, it is problematic to run a
regression of one institutional variable (e.g. investor
protection) on another institutional variable
(e.g. disclosure regulation). Such an analysis
essentially treats one variable as more primitive
than another, which may be justified in some cases,
but in many others it is clearly not appropriate,
given the joint evolution of many institutional
factors and the feedback effects between them.
Similar issues arise when regressing market
outcomes (e.g. ownership concentration, financial
development) on legal institutions or regulatory
variables. Take for instance the association between
dispersed ownership and investor protection. It is
clearly plausible that strong investor protection
facilitates the dispersion of ownership, essentially
allowing investors to hold smaller stakes and to
diversify without fear of expropriation. But it is
equally plausible that, in countries with more
dispersed ownership, regulators are more concerned
about outside investor protection, especially in
financial crises, as investors are likely to play an
important role in the political process (Coffee,
2007). Thus, causality could run in both directions.
This example highlights the interactive nature of
institutional development, which makes it difficult
to attribute a combination of institutional charac-
teristics to a particular factor or reason.17
Moreover, a candidate variable like legal origin
may act as a summary measure for a country’s
approach to a number of regulatory issues and
therefore could have significant explanatory power
in regressions involving institutional (or country)
variables. But this finding does not imply that the
variable itself is indeed a causal factor. For similar
reasons, it can be misleading to run ‘horse races’
between institutional variables with respect to their
explanatory power for outcomes such as countries’
reporting practices or financial development.
At this point, there is no definitive answer as to
why countries exhibit particular bundles of institu-
tional characteristics but it is clear that many factors
play a role, including legal, political and historical
reasons (see also Malmendier, 2009). The existence
of complementarities implies that countries’ insti-
tutional frameworks exhibit hysteresis and path
dependence. Thus, starting points and historical
events matter for today’s institutional infrastruc-
tures, making it difficult to disentangle the deter-
minants of the institutional clusters.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 08 ABR Leuz.3d Page 242 of 256
17 That said, it is sometimes possible to exploit historical
variation in regulation to study the link between regulation and
market outcomes. See, for instance, the analysis in Agrawal
(2009) for the effects of investor protection on firms’ financing
decisions and investment policy.
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Table 3
Institutional clusters around the world (k=3)
Panel A: Cluster membership using regulatory variables only
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Australia
Canada
Hong Kong
India
Ireland
Israel
Malaysia
New Zealand
Singapore
South Africa
Taiwan
Thailand
United Kingdom
United States
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Japan
Korea (South)
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Egypt
Indonesia
Jordan
Kenya
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Panel B: Cluster membership using regulatory and market outcome variables
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Australia
Canada
Hong Kong
Israel
Malaysia
Singapore
United Kingdom
United States
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea (South)
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Egypt
Indonesia
Jordan
Kenya
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
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Considering these challenges, the goal of this
section is more modest. It intends to illustrate the
existence of institutional clusters and to demon-
strate why commonly used variables (such as legal
origin) yield such powerful characterisations. To do
so, I follow the approach in Leuz et al. (2003) and
identify country clusters with similar institutional
features. This approach, while being descriptive and
exploratory in nature, captures interactions among
institutional factors irrespective of where they come
from. These clusters can also be used to document
systematic patterns in corporate reporting practices.
For instance, Leuz et al. (2003, Table 3) use nine
institutional variables from La Porta et al. (1997 and
1998) and perform a k-means cluster analysis of 31
countries, ex ante specifying three country clusters.
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Table 3
Institutional clusters around the world (k=3) (continued)
Panel C: Cluster membership using regulatory and reporting practice variables
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Australia
Canada
Hong Kong
Ireland
Israel
Malaysia
New Zealand
Singapore
South Africa
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Japan
Korea (South)
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Greece
India
Italy
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
United Kingdom
United States
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Portugal
Taiwan
Thailand
Panel D: Mean values for clusters in Panel B
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
CIFAR disclosure score 66.36 71.64 77.63
Earnings management and opacity score 0.34 0.54 0.55
The table presents results from k-means cluster analyses for a sample of a maximum of 49 countries
specifying three distinct clusters (k=3). Panel A reports the results using the regulatory variables from
Table 2 with respect to securities regulation, investor protection and enforcement (except the indicator for
class-action lawsuits as binary variables can be problematic in cluster analysis). Panel B extends the set of
institutional variables and includes the regulatory variables plus three financial development variables from
Djankov et al. (2008), i.e. the ratio of stock market capitalisation held by small shareholders to GDP, the
ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population, and the ratio of equity
issued by newly-listed firms in a given country to its GDP (all three ratios are averaged from 1996 to 2000).
Panel C extends the set of institutional variables and includes the regulatory variables plus two variables that
capture firms’ reporting practices, i.e. the CIFAR disclosure score for 1995 and an updated earnings
management and opacity score from Leuz et al. (2003) computed from 1995 to 2005. See Appendix
Table for more details. All variables are standardised to z-scores. For all analyses, I sort the data by per-
capita GDP in 2000 and specify that initially k nearly equal partitions are formed from the data such that
approximately the first N/k observations are assigned to the first group, the second N/k observations to the
second group, and so on. The group means from these k groups are used as the starting group centres. As
cluster analysis can be sensitive to the initial starting groups, I repeat the analyses with different starting
clusters to check robustness and representativeness of the final clusters. Panel D reports the mean CIFAR
disclosure score and the mean earnings management and opacity score for each cluster in Panel B. The
differences in means across clusters are statistically significant at the 10% level or better except for the
difference in the earnings management scores between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3.
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These three clusters can be interpreted as follows.
The first cluster is characterised by large stock
markets, low ownership concentration, extensive
outsider rights, high disclosure and strong legal
enforcement. Thus, countries in the first cluster
have institutional features that are typical for
‘outsider economies’ as described in Section 3.2.
The countries in the second and third cluster have
institutional features of ‘insider economies’ such as
smaller stock markets, higher ownership concen-
tration, weaker investor protection, and lower
disclosure levels. Countries in the second and
third cluster are similar on these dimensions but
differ markedly in the strength of their legal
systems. Thus, there are essentially two major
factors in the data. One factor is the fundamental
choice between an outsider system and an insider
system. The other factor is the effectiveness of the
legal and enforcement system. As the specific
system choice is unlikely to matter much when the
legal system that enforces the system is weak, there
are only three clusters. The distribution of legal
origins across the three clusters shown in Leuz et al.
(2003: Table 3) is consistent with the above
interpretation.
In this paper, I extend the cluster analysis in
Leuz et al. (2003) in two ways: First, I expand the
set of countries. Second, I use an updated set of
institutional variables. Given the paper’s focus on
differences in reporting regulation around the
world, I begin with a k-means cluster analysis
that includes only regulatory (plus related enforce-
ment) variables from Table 2. Like Leuz et al.
(2003), I ex ante specify three clusters. Panel A of
Table 3 reports the clusters from this analysis. The
first cluster contains Anglo-American countries as
well as other countries with English legal origin
plus Taiwan. The second cluster consists of
Continental European and Scandinavian countries,
Chile and two developed countries from Asia with
German legal origin, namely Japan and South
Korea. The third cluster comprises developing
market economies from Africa, Asia and Latin
America.
Next, I include three variables for capital market
development along with the regulatory variables.18
This specification is intended to capture similarities
in financial market outcomes among countries and
not just differences in the rules and the enforcement
system. The results reported in Panel B are quite
similar to those in Panel A. The main changes are
that several countries from the first cluster in Panel
A move to the second cluster (e.g. India, South
Africa, Taiwan) or to the third cluster
(e.g. Thailand) as they have less developed financial
markets. That is, while these countries have rules
‘on the books’ that are similar to the other countries
in the first cluster, the capital market outcomes for
these countries are more similar to those of
countries in the second or third cluster, presumably
indicating weaker enforcement of the rules.
In Panel C, I add two variables measuring the
transparency of firms’ reporting practices to the set
of regulatory and enforcement variables: (1) the
CIFAR disclosure index, which measures the
inclusion or omission of certain information items
in firms’ annual reports and (2) an updated version
of the earnings management and opacity score from
Leuz et al. (2003), which captures four different
properties of reported earnings.19 Both variables are
available only for 37 countries. Nevertheless, the
results including the two reporting practices vari-
ables are quite similar to those in Panel A using just
the regulatory and related enforcement variables
from Table 2. But we also see several reclassifica-
tions of countries from the first cluster in Panel A to
the third cluster in Panel C (e.g. Thailand and
Taiwan) and of countries from the second cluster in
Panel A to the third cluster (e.g. Greece, Italy and
Portugal), as they have more opaque reporting
practices. These reclassifications again highlight the
distinction between formal institutional design and
actual outcomes and practices.
Overall, these results confirm the existence of
institutional clusters with respect to securities
regulation, investor protection and legal enforce-
ment systems. Moreover, the resulting clusters
resemble closely classifications by region, eco-
nomic development and especially legal origin,
even though these variables are not used in the
cluster analysis. Cluster membership is fairly stable
even if market outcomes and reporting practices are
added to the analysis and the results do not appear
particularly sensitive to the set of institutional
variables. For all three panels in Table 3, the
clusters fit the earlier categorisation by Leuz et al.
(2003) into outsider economies (cluster 1), insider
economies with better legal enforcement systems
(cluster 2) and insider economies with weaker legal
enforcement systems (cluster 3).
Obviously, these results and conclusions may
hinge on the number of clusters that are ex ante
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18Whenever possible, I use variables that are close in time to
the construction of the regulatory variables from Table 2. See
description of Table 3 for details.
19 The updated earnings management and opacity score is
computed from 1995 to 2005. It is the average of four scores as
defined in Leuz et al. (2003) but computed with slight
modifications. See Appendix for more details.
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specified for the k-means cluster analysis.20 As the
number of clusters is arbitrarily chosen, I repeat the
analysis increasing the number of clusters (setting k
to four and five) and using the same three combin-
ations of regulatory, market outcome and reporting
practice variables as in Table 3. Clearly, specifying
more clusters allows finer groupings of countries.
To illustrate, Table 4 presents the results specifying
five clusters and using only the regulatory variables.
Compared to Table 3, Panel A, the emerging market
economies now populate two clusters and the fourth
cluster consists predominantly of countries with
French legal origin.
However, the main thrust of the analysis is the
same with more clusters as before. Clusters tend to
reflect legal origin, geography, and country wealth
(even though these variables are not used in the
analysis), which probably explains why these
distinctions have been heavily used in the literature
to describe countries’ institutional similarities and
differences. The grouping of Anglo-American (or
English legal origin) countries like the US, the UK,
Australia and Canada into a cluster is a robust result,
as is the joint grouping of many Continental
European countries. The UK often shares the
same cluster with Canada, Hong Kong, India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore, indicating the
UK’s influence on the institutional design of its
dominions and former colonies. This is especially
true if the analysis uses variables that describe the
formal design of the institutional system, rather than
market or reporting outcomes. There is evidence of
regional and cultural similarities (e.g. Germany and
Austria almost always share a cluster; countries in
Asia or Latin America often form a regional cluster)
as well as evidence of similarities that come with
country wealth (e.g. joint groupings of developing
countries).
The robust grouping of countries with the same
legal origin or from the same cultural region is
consistent with the notion that history matters for
institutional development. However, I do not claim
that legal origin, geography or country wealth are
causal determinants of countries’ institutional infra-
structures. But they are powerful summary vari-
ables that conveniently capture many institutional
similarities and differences.
To conclude my institutional analysis, I examine
differences in firms’ reporting practices across the
three institutional clusters presented in Table 3.
Using the two transparency scores described
earlier, I find that countries in cluster 1 have
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Table 4
Institutional clusters around the world (k=5)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Australia
Canada
Hong Kong
India
Israel
Malaysia
Singapore
United Kingdom
United States
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea (South)
Netherlands
New Zealand
South Africa
Taiwan
Austria
Chile
Denmark
France
Germany
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Argentina
Colombia
Ecuador
Egypt
Greece
Jordan
Kenya
Mexico
Uruguay
Venezuela
Brazil
Indonesia
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Turkey
Zimbabwe
The table presents results from k-means cluster analysis for a sample of a maximum of 49 countries
specifying five distinct clusters (k=5). The analysis uses the regulatory variables from Table 2 with respect
to securities regulation, investor protection and enforcement (except the indicator for class-action lawsuits as
binary variables can be problematic in cluster analysis). The clusters are similar if I extend the set of
institutional variables and include three financial development variables for the year 2000 from Djankov et
al. (2008). All variables are standardised to z-scores. I sort the data by per-capita GDP in 2000 and specify
that initially k nearly equal partitions are formed from the data such that approximately the first N/k
observations are assigned to the first group, the second N/k observations to the second group, and so on.
The group means from these k groups are used as the starting group centres. As cluster analysis can be
sensitive to the initial starting groups, I repeat the analyses with different starting clusters to check
robustness and representativeness of the final clusters.
20 In addition, cluster analysis can be sensitive to the
composition of the k starting clusters. I therefore perform
sensitivity analyses using different starting clusters. The tenor of
the results is similar but the final clusters can vary somewhat
depending on the starting clusters chosen. See Table 3 for more
details on starting clusters.
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higher disclosure scores and more informative
earnings than countries in cluster 2 or cluster 3
(Panel D, Table 3). Countries in cluster 2 exhibit
on average higher transparency scores than coun-
tries in cluster 3. These differences are generally
statistically significant and indicate that countries
with stronger securities, investor protection and
self-dealing regulation (and associated enforce-
ment systems) tend to exhibit more transparent
reporting practices.
4.3. Differences among countries in the same
cluster: a caveat
Despite the clustering of countries documented in
the previous section, I hasten to add that there are
many differences between countries (in a given
cluster) that are not captured by my analysis. As
mentioned before, the analysis is deliberately
conducted at a relatively high level to emphasise
that reporting regulation is tied into the broader
institutional infrastructure. But this should not mask
the fact that even countries in the Anglo-American
group exhibit material and important differences
with respect to reporting regulation and related
institutional arrangements, especially at a more
micro level.21
For example, the US is generally viewed as
having a more litigious environment than either
Canada or the UK (e.g. Clarkson and Simunic,
1994). This difference can be important with respect
to reporting regulation because of the role of
shareholder litigation in enforcement. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the debate about
its costs to US firms illustrate this interaction and,
more generally, the importance of institutional fit of
reporting regulation. Coates (2007) argues that
SOX was quite costly for US firms, not because of
the internal control provisions per se, but due to its
interaction with the US litigation system. Litigation
concerns created incentives for managers, directors
and auditors to overspend on internal controls
because these parties bear only a fraction of the
compliance costs but share disproportionately in the
adverse consequences from control deficiencies.
Another (related) example for differences
between countries in the same cluster is the level
of enforcement activity in securities markets.22
Jackson (2007) shows that there are substantial
differences in enforcement intensity of financial
regulation across jurisdictions and that they exist
even between countries in the Anglo-American
cluster. The US has much larger budgets and higher
staffing levels than code-law countries like France,
Germany or Sweden, even when adjusting by GDP
or population. But US budgets and staff levels are
also high compared to the UK (although much of
this difference is driven by banking supervision).
The differences between the US and the UK are
more striking when looking at differences in
enforcement activities in the securities markets.
Jackson (2007) demonstrates that even adjusting for
market size the SEC takes substantially more
enforcement action and imposes substantially
higher (monetary) penalties than the FSA in the
UK (see also Jackson and Roe, 2009). Yet, this
comparison is still likely to understate actual
enforcement differences between the US and the
UK because it does not account for private secur-
ities litigation and the imposition of criminal
penalties, both of which tend to be more common
in the US (Coffee, 2007). In many ways, the US
appears to be a major outlier when it comes to
enforcement and quite different from fellow Anglo-
American countries.
One important implication of differences in
enforcement activities across countries is that we
have to be careful with de jure comparisons of
enforcement systems and, more generally, regula-
tion. The effect of regulation can differ substantially
depending on the degree to which the rules are
actually enforced (see also Mahoney, 2009). This
also points to a limitation of those analyses in
Section 4.2 that primarily focus on the differences in
regulation and enforcement systems, rather than
actual practices. However, theses analyses are
merely intended to illustrate similarities in institu-
tional design and the existence of institutional
complementarities. To address this issue, I also
provide results using financial market outcomes and
reporting practices, both of which should reflect de
facto differences in regulation.23
5. Evolution of reporting regimes and global
accounting convergence
So far the discussion has focused primarily on
(static) differences in reporting regulation and, more
generally, on institutional differences across coun-
tries. But obviously reporting regimes evolve over
time. Thus, in this section, I discuss the evolution of
reporting regimes.
As noted before, there are far fewer academic
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21 See also Coffee (2007) and Gadinis and Jackson (2007)
and their detailed institutional comparisons of securities regu-
lation in the US, UK and several other countries.
22 Yet another example is the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach to
corporate governance in the UK, which is less prescriptive than
the US approach as it manifests, for instance, in SOX.
23 The obvious issue with using practices in regression
analyses is their endogenous nature.
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studies on what drives institutional change and
regulatory reform compared to work on the ration-
ale for regulation in the first place (see also Leuz and
Wysocki, 2008). Regimes often change in response
to financial crises and corporate scandals but
political processes clearly play an important role.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all
potential factors that play a role for institutional
change. Instead, I focus on the implications of two
concepts that are central to this paper. First, I
delineate the implications of institutional comple-
mentarities for the evolution of regulatory regimes
in general. Second, I discuss what the documented
differences in securities, investor protection and
self-dealing regulation, including the respective
enforcement systems, imply for a global conver-
gence of reporting practices, which has been a goal
of many standard-setters, regulators, politicians and
market participants (e.g. G20 Progress Report on 25
September 2009). The demand for more compar-
able reporting practices has been the impetus for the
widespread adoption of IFRS around the world,
which is one of the most significant regulatory
changes in accounting history.
My main point is that the existence of institu-
tional differences and complementarities makes a
widespread convergence of reporting practices in
the foreseeable future unlikely. In fact, such
convergence may even be undesirable. I therefore
conclude this section with a proposal for a new
regulatory approach that promises to achieve con-
vergence in reporting practices for a set of firms for
which comparable reporting practices is presum-
ably in high demand and more likely to be
achievable and beneficial.
5.1. Implications of institutional complementarities
for the evolution of reporting regimes
The existence of institutional complementarities has
a number of important implications for the evolu-
tion of reporting regimes. First, it implies that
changes in reporting regulation cannot be con-
sidered in isolation and independent of other
elements of the institutional infrastructure.
Changing one element can make the system (or
economy) worse off even when the element itself
improves unambiguously. For instance, it is not
obvious that a country is better off adopting IFRS
even if we agreed that, considered in isolation, the
set of IFRS is ‘better’ than the existing (local)
reporting standards. Institutional fit should be part
of the consideration. Thus, it is not obvious that
having a single set of accounting standards around
the world is desirable or that IFRS are the ‘right’ set
of reporting standards for every country, despite the
potential comparability benefits.
Second, the existence of complementarities
implies that there are impediments to institutional
change because in order to preserve institutional fit,
countries need to change (or adjust) several elem-
ents when they change one. Complementarities
likely lead to path dependencies in institutional
change, i.e. historical starting points matter. Given
these impediments, convergence of regimes is
likely to be slow and may not take place even if
such convergence is desirable. Moreover, it is not
obvious that regulatory competition among report-
ing regimes works or yields desirable outcomes.
A third implication is that even if countries
harmonise their accounting standards at a given
point in time (e.g. by adopting the same set of
standards), it is questionable that this harmonisation
is stable over time. The new set of standards will be
subject to the same institutional and market pres-
sures that shaped the old standards in the first place.
Thus, unless other key institutional factors converge
as well, countries adopting the rules (e.g. a common
set of accounting standards) are likely to drift apart
over time, in part due to local adaptation of the
rules. These forces should not be underestimated.
For instance, capital market pressures and new
business practices probably were the major impetus
for change in US accounting standards, and, more
important than regulatory competition, with other
accounting standards around the world (Hail et al.,
2009).
5.2. Institutional differences, reporting incentives
and reporting convergence
Existing institutional differences in securities,
investor protection and self-dealing regulation and
associated enforcement systems have important
implications for the convergence reporting prac-
tices. Regulators and standard-setters around the
world have undertaken substantial efforts to elim-
inate international differences in reporting stand-
ards. The development and worldwide adoption of
IFRS have been at the core of these efforts. The idea
is that the adoption of a common set of accounting
standards leads to more comparable reporting
practices around the world. There is also the hope
that the adoption of a set of high-quality accounting
standards, like IFRS, will lead to more transparent
and higher-quality reporting in many countries.
While more comparable reporting (practices) can
offer significant cost savings and economic benefits,
recent work in the international accounting literature
raises considerable doubt that these benefits will
materialise as a result of worldwide IFRS adoption
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(see, e.g. summary in Hail et al., 2009).24 This work
emphasises that firms’ reporting practices are
shaped by more than the accounting standards (or
the enforcement of these standards) pointing to the
importance of firms’ reporting incentives as a key
driver of observed reporting practices and hence the
quality and comparability of the reported numbers.
The starting point of this literature is the recog-
nition that accounting standards give firms substan-
tial reporting discretion because the application of
the standards generally involves considerable judg-
ment. For example, accounting measurements rely
on management’s private information and involve
an assessment of the future, which makes account-
ing measurements subjective representations of
management’s information set. It is also important
to recognise that firms are given reporting discretion
for a good reason (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman,
1986). Rigid reporting rules are unlikely to capture
the complexities of firms’ economic realities and
make it harder to convey forward-looking informa-
tion residing within management, which by its very
nature is often less verifiable. Reporting discretion
allows managers to use private information to
produce reports that more accurately reflect firm
performance and are more informative to outside
parties. But whether managers use reporting dis-
cretion in this way depends on their reporting
incentives. Managers may also have incentives to
obfuscate economic performance, achieve certain
earnings targets, avoid covenant violations, under-
report liabilities, or smooth earnings – to name just a
few. Given managers’ information advantage over
investors and even auditors and enforcement agen-
cies, it is difficult to constrain such behaviour. But
the issue is not just a matter of proper enforcement
of the accounting standards. While strict enforce-
ment limits what managers can report, it does not
eliminate the discretion built into the rules. Even in
a hypothetical world with perfect enforcement,
observed reporting behaviour will differ as long as
firms have different reporting incentives and the
accounting standards offer discretion (Leuz, 2006).
Firms’ reporting incentives are shaped by many
country- and firm-level factors, including a coun-
try’s legal institutions (e.g. the rule of law), the
strength of the enforcement regime, capital market
forces (e.g. the need to raise outside capital),
product market competition, a firm’s compensation
structure, ownership and governance structure, as
well as its operating characteristics (e.g. the busi-
ness model or the length of the operating cycle).
While we have more evidence on some factors than
others, the evidence as a whole clearly supports the
notion that institutional and market factors influ-
ence observed reporting and disclosure practices
(e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Leuz et
al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004).25 Moreover, we have
considerable evidence that reporting practices differ
considerably across firms and countries, even when
firms are subject to the same accounting standards,
and that differences in reporting practices can be
explained by differences in factors that shape firms’
reporting incentives (e.g. Ball et al., 2003; Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Lang et
al., 2006; Daske et al., 2009).
An important implication of these findings is that
the role of accounting standards is much more
limited in bringing about global reporting conver-
gence than often thought. Moving to a single set of
accounting standards is not enough to produce
comparability of reporting and disclosure practices,
even if these standards were strictly enforced in all
countries. Reporting incentives continue to vary
systematically across firms, industries, stock
exchanges, countries, and cultural and geographic
regions.
Illustrating this point empirically, the (rank)
correlation between the Leuz et al. (2003) earnings
management and opacity score computed from
1986 to 1995 and the same score computed from
1996 to 2005 is 0.73, which is quite high. It is even
higher (0.87) when I compute the correlation
between the score from 1990 to 1999 and the
score from 2000 to 2005. Thus, the rank order of
countries in terms of the transparency of their
reporting practices remained remarkably stable
from 1990 to 2005, despite many efforts to
converge firms’ reporting practices since the early
1990s.26 In fact, when I compute a rolling 10-year
earnings management and opacity score, nine
(seven) out of the 10 highest (lowest) scoring
countries from 1990 to 1999 are also among the 10
highest (lowest) scoring countries from 1996 to
2005, again illustrating the stickiness of firms’
reporting practices (see Appendix for rankings and
more details on the computation of the scores).
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24 In addition, there are likely to be significant costs from
convergence if institutional fit matters, as discussed earlier.
25 The earnings management literature also supports the
notion of reporting incentives. See Healy and Wahlen (1999)
and Dechow and Skinner (2000).
26 I recognise that, technically, countries’ reporting practices
can improve or converge without a change in their rank order.
As a practical matter, however, this seems unlikely. I would
expect the (time-series) correlation of the scores to decrease
with convergence because rank order changes become more
likely as countries’ practices move closer together. That said, a
more rigorous analysis of whether countries’ reporting practices
have converged in recent years is warranted and an important
issue for future research.
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Based on the aforementioned arguments and
evidence, convergence in financial reporting prac-
tices is unlikely unless other key factors that shape
firms’ reporting incentives converge as well.
However, convergence of many of these other
factors is very difficult to achieve. Countries’
enforcement systems are an important case in
point. As discussed in Section 4, they differ
considerably across countries and even when
enforcement systems appear to be similar in design,
there can be substantial differences in enforcement
intensity (or practices). Eliminating these differ-
ences, especially as they pertain to countries’ legal
systems, is probably much harder than agreeing to a
single set of accounting standards.
In summary, true convergence in reporting
practices seems far away and would require a
much broader convergence of countries’ institu-
tional frameworks, which is unrealistic in the near
future (and probably not even desirable). This
conclusion brings me to my proposal of a new
approach towards global convergence of reporting
practices.
5.3. A new approach to global reporting
convergence: the global player segment
My proposal starts from the premise that IFRS are
set to become the global accounting language but it
recognises that, for the reasons discussed in the
previous section, there will be considerable hetero-
geneity in firms’ reporting practices for years to
come. IFRS offer substantial discretion, like any
other set of accounting standards. Moreover, the
principles-based nature of IFRS implies that differ-
ences in firms’ reporting incentives matter greatly
for observed reporting practices. As a result,
differences in countries’ institutional factors are
likely to remain a major source of heterogeneity in
reporting practices, despite the widespread adoption
of IFRS around the world (see also Ball, 2006;
Nobes, 2006; Hail et al., 2009). Put differently,
differences in capital markets, securities regulation,
investor protection, enforcement systems and eco-
nomic development, just to name a few, continue to
shape firms’ reporting incentives, which makes
comparable reporting around the globe unlikely.
Supporting this conjecture, Daske et al. (2008)
provide evidence that, in many countries, manda-
tory IFRS adoption had little impact on market
liquidity or other capital market outcomes.
Moreover, they show that countries’ institutional
differences, including legal enforcement, play a key
role for the capital market effects around IFRS
adoption.
My proposal also recognises that there appears to
be a substantial demand from investors, analysts
and regulators for more comparable corporate
reporting, especially for the so-called ‘global play-
ers,’ i.e. firms that operate and raise finance
globally. Given this demand, I suggest a new
approach that is more likely to yield comparable
reporting practices for these firms than IFRS
adoption alone. I propose to create a global player
segment (GPS) in which participating firms use the
same standards (i.e. IFRS), face the same enforce-
ment mechanisms and are likely to have similar
reporting incentives. There are two core ideas
behind the proposed GPS and its approach towards
reporting convergence for global players.
The first core idea is to provide comparable
enforcement across participating firms. Now that
IFRS have been widely adopted around the world,
reporting standards are no longer the main issue.27
Instead, we need to shift attention towards differ-
ences in the enforcement of reporting and disclo-
sure rules, which are still quite pronounced. But
even harmonising enforcement is not going to be
sufficient. If the goal is to achieve comparable
reporting, we also need to reduce differences in
firms’ reporting incentives. Thus, the second core
idea of the GPS is to exploit self-selection by letting
firms opt into the segment. The GPS would provide
a way for firms to convey to market and investors
that they are serious about transparency because
participating firms essentially commit to tough
reporting regulation and enforcement. Such a
commitment through joining the GPS should be
attractive to firms that have an international share-
holder base, raise finance internationally, operate in
many countries and hence would benefit from more
comparable reporting. Moreover, for firms with
substantial growth opportunities and external finan-
cing needs, a commitment to transparency is
important and beneficial, particularly if they come
from jurisdictions with weaker institutions. This is
the central message of the cross-listing literature:
firms seek such commitments and markets reward
them (e.g. Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Doidge et al.,
2004, 2009a; Hail and Leuz, 2009).28 If the rules
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 08 ABR Leuz.3d Page 250 of 256
27 Obviously, the US is still an exception. But even if the US
decides not to adopt IFRS or not to permit US firms to use IFRS,
one can argue that IFRS and US GAAP are close enough so that
standards are not the issue.
28 Cross-listing in the US is an alternative mechanism.
However, US cross-listings have been critically debated in
recent years. There are concerns that private securities litigation
is excessive in the US and that foreign firms may face new
regulations that have been designed primarily with US firms in
mind. For this debate and some evidence, see Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation (2006), Doidge et al. (2008, 2009a).
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and the enforcement in the GPS are strict and
credible, only some firms will be willing to
participate. This is an intended outcome. Self-
selection is important as it implies that participating
firms are likely to have relatively similar reporting
incentives in the first place.
To ensure and reinforce the selection effect, firms
would not automatically become part of the GPS
upon application. They would have to be approved
by the administrating body of the GPS. A formal
approval process would allow for additional screen-
ing based on certain firm characteristics
(e.g. corporate governance, ownership structure),
which in turn would further reduce differences in
firms’ reporting incentives among participating
firms.
To have global reach and appeal, the GPS has to
be operated by a supra-national body. One possi-
bility is to have IOSCO create the GPS at the global
level. But in principle the proposal could also be
implemented at the regional level. For instance, if
the goal is to achieve greater convergence of
reporting practices in the EU, CESR would be a
natural body to create such a segment. Another
possibility is to create a new independent body that
privately operates the GPS and has an oversight
board with trustees.
Membership in the GPS would be organised as
a private contract between the participating firm
and the administrative body operating the seg-
ment. The contract would stipulate a jurisdiction
should there be a legal dispute. This private
contracting solution does not involve cross-listing
the participating firm’s stock at a particular
exchange. The advantage of this arrangement is
that the GPS does not compete with stock
exchanges or firms’ extant listings. Thus, a firm
could concentrate its liquidity and trading in one
place (e.g. its home-country exchange) but still be
part of the segment.
In terms of rules, the GPS could impose
additional disclosure requirements beyond those
in IFRS. From the viewpoint of reporting incen-
tives, disclosures about related-party transactions,
compensation policies, internal controls, risk-man-
agement practices and off-balance-sheet arrange-
ments are particularly relevant and could be
considered. Credible disclosure requirements in
these areas should make the GPS less attractive to
firms in which controlling insiders engage in
investor expropriation and private benefit consump-
tion. Such firms tend to have weaker reporting
incentives (Leuz et al., 2003). Thus, additional
disclosure requirements would have the effect of
further aligning the reporting incentives of partici-
pating firms.29 Similarly, the GPS could impose
governance requirements that are likely to reassure
outside investors with respect to the quality of
corporate reporting, such as having an audit com-
mittee or having independent directors on the audit
committee.
On the enforcement side, the GPS’s aimwould be
to harmonise the enforcement of IFRS for partici-
pating firms, despite widespread differences in legal
and enforcement systems around the world.
Moreover, by tightening enforcement relative to
what many participating firms face in their home
countries, the GPS would not only align but also
improve firms’ reporting incentives and provide a
credible commitment to transparency, which in turn
would have tangible benefits. Towards these goals,
the GPS would use a number of enforcement
mechanisms.
First, GPS firms would be required to use a GPS
approved auditor. Not all auditors would be eligible
to audit participating firms. The GPS administrating
body would approve audit firms. Being an approved
GPS auditor would also come with certain reporting
requirements for the auditor, e.g. about key events
such as new staff disciplinary actions or legal
actions against the audit firm. These reporting
requirements could bemodelled on existing rules by
the US Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. Second, GPS enforcement staff would
monitor the compliance with its additional disclo-
sure (and governance) requirements. In addition, it
would have the right to review firms’ financial
statements and disclosures as well as the right to
seek further information and clarification on these
documents. Firms would be required to respond to
such requests for further information. Such a review
would be mandatory (and not just an option) if there
is no review process for financial statements in a
firm’s home country. Third, the GPS contract would
give GPS enforcement staff the right to on-site
inspections and to seize certain documents in the
event of GPS staff having serious concerns about a
firm’s reporting practices. Fourth, the GPS would
publish its enforcement actions against a partici-
pating firm. Finally, it would have the right to expel
firms from the segment for non-compliance with its
requirements. The last two mechanisms would
essentially rely on adverse publicity and market
reactions as a way to enforce GPS rules. To the
29 Such requirements could also become an important tool to
the extent that future IFRS become more of a political
‘compromise’ as more countries adopt IFRS and try to influence
the standard-setting process. See Hail et al. (2009) for a
discussion of the political risks in the IFRS standard-setting
process.
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extent that these enforcement mechanisms are
viewed as insufficient, firms could be asked to
post a monetary bond in an (interest-bearing)
escrow account upon becoming a GPS member.
This bond would be forfeit if a firm is expelled from
the GPS or leaves the GPS after violating its rules.
This arrangement would increase the commitment
value of the GPS even further.
A key question is obviously how the operation of
the GPS can be financed. Among other things, the
GPS would need well-qualified enforcement staff in
sufficient numbers to perform its monitoring and
compliance role. Membership fees are an obvious
source of funding. That is, GPS firms would be
asked to pay an annual fee. Participating firms are
the primary beneficiary and to the extent that the
GPS provides a credible commitment to transpar-
ency, firms should receive tangible benefits (see
Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Asking participating
firms to pay for GPS membership amounts to an
important ‘market test’ and provides incentives to
design and operate the GPS in a way that adds value
to firms. If firmswere unwilling to pay for a segment
that is designed to achieve greater comparability of
firms’ reporting practices (and to overcome the issue
of externalities), then this would be a clear sign that
we need to re-think the case for global convergence
of reporting practices in the first place.
However, corporate funding alone also has
drawbacks. For instance, it can create conflicting
interests when the time comes for the GPS staff to
be tough on a particular firm. Therefore, it will be
important for the GPS to have further funding
sources. There are several options. First, exchanges
that list GPS member firms could pay a fee as they
benefit from the certification and assurance that the
GPS provides. Second, audit firms that are
approved to audit GPS firms could pay an annual
fee. Third, some funding could come from or via the
IASC Foundation as the GPS contributes to the
reputation of IFRS. Fourth, the G20 have called for
more progress towards global reporting conver-
gence. If they are serious about this goal, then they
should consider providing financial support to
achieve it. Finally, the GPS could raise royalty
fees from financial service firms that use the GPS to
create new products. For instance, the GPS could
ask for a licensing fee when a financial firm creates
an index based on securities from firms that
participate in the GPS.
6. Conclusion
This paper discusses differences in countries’
approaches to reporting regulation and explores
reasons why they exist in the first place and why
they are likely to persist. After delineating various
regulatory choices and discussing the trade-offs
associated with these choices, I provide a basic
framework based on the notion of institutional
complementarities that helps us understand exist-
ing differences in corporate reporting and other
regulation. The paper also provides descriptive
and stylised evidence on regulatory and institu-
tional differences across countries. It highlights
that there are robust institutional clusters around
the world.
A key message of this paper is that these clusters
are likely to persist in the foreseeable future given
the complementarities among countries’ institu-
tions. Another key message is that there are
substantial enforcement differences around the
world. An important implication of both messages
is that reporting practices are unlikely to converge
globally, despite widespread IFRS adoption.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a strong demand
for convergence in reporting practices for globally
operating firms. Thus, I propose a different way
forward that does not require convergence of
regulatory approaches across countries. The pro-
posal is to create a GPS, in which firms play by the
same reporting rules (i.e. IFRS), face the same
enforcement, and are likely to have similar incen-
tives for transparent reporting. The GPS could be
created and operated by IOSCO or other supra-
national institutions. The core ideas behind this
segment are twofold. First, it would provide
comparable enforcement across participating
firms. Second, it would exploit self-selection into
the segment to align participating firms’ reporting
incentives. The segment should be attractive to
globally operating firms that have the desire to
credibly signal that they are serious about their
commitment to transparency.
But even if the GPS proposal is not successful, it
turns the spotlight on the shortcomings of a
convergence approach that relies primarily on
IFRS adoption, in the face of major institutional
and enforcement differences around the world.
Thus, my hope is that this proposal at least
contributes to a more rigorous debate about what
it takes to achieve global reporting convergence.
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Appendix
Transparency scores
Country name
LNW Score
1990–1999
LNW Score
1996–2005
CIFAR Index
1995
Argentina 0.371 0.391 68
Australia 0.149 0.078 80
Austria 0.862 0.808 62
Belgium 0.739 0.682 68
Brazil NA 0.658 56
Canada 0.286 0.162 75
Chile 0.267 0.358 78
Colombia NA 0.478 58
Denmark 0.475 0.530 75
Egypt NA NA NA
Ecuador NA NA NA
Finland 0.397 0.260 83
France 0.475 0.536 78
Germany 0.726 0.620 67
Greece 0.910 0.881 61
Hong Kong 0.371 0.521 73
India 0.486 0.537 61
Indonesia 0.796 0.715 NA
Ireland 0.428 0.199 81
Israel 0.367 0.329 74
Italy 0.844 0.826 66
Japan 0.856 0.802 71
Jordan NA NA NA
Korea (South) NA NA 68
Kenya 0.765 0.693 NA
Malaysia 0.666 0.643 79
Mexico NA 0.502 71
Netherlands 0.593 0.482 74
New Zealand 0.182 0.121 80
Norway NA NA 75
Nigeria 0.330 0.306 70
Pakistan 0.677 0.706 73
Peru NA 0.464 NA
Philippines 0.372 0.552 64
Portugal 0.774 0.880 56
Singapore 0.646 0.601 79
South Africa 0.235 0.307 79
Spain 0.756 0.792 72
Sri Lanka NA NA 74
Sweden 0.394 0.168 83
Switzerland 0.637 0.504 80
Taiwan 0.452 0.639 58
Thailand 0.453 0.506 66
Turkey NA NA 58
United Kingdom 0.216 0.133 85
United States 0.115 0.228 76
Uruguay NA NA NA
Venezuela NA NA NA
Zimbabwe NA NA 72
The table provides transparency scores for the sample of 49 countries in Table 2 (if available). The
first two columns present (updated) earnings management and opacity scores based on Leuz, Nanda
and Wysocki (2003) (LNW Scores) that are computed from 1990 to 1999 and 1996 to 2005,
respectively. Following LNW, the earnings management and opacity score consists of four different
metrics measuring the extent to which firms’ reported earnings obfuscate economic performance due
to earnings smoothing and the use of reporting discretion. As a slight deviation from LNW, the
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Appendix
Transparency scores (continued)
smoothing scores are first computed by firm (requiring a minimum of four firm-years) and then
aggregated at the country level (which should be more accurate). I use percentage (rather than raw)
ranks to aggregate the four metrics into the aggregate country score. Following LNW, I require that
countries have a minimum number of firm-year observations (i.e. 500) to compute the loss aversion
metric and I discard country-years with high inflation rates (above 20%) before computing the four
individual metrics. The CIFAR Index is created by the Center for Financial Analysis and Research
based on firms’ 1995 annual reports. It counts the inclusion (or omission) of 90 items that fall into
seven broad disclosure categories and, in each country, the index covers a minimum of three
companies (see Bushman et al., 2004, for more details).
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